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Abstract. Messaging systems operating within the public cloud are gaining popu-
larity. To protect message conﬁdentiality from the public cloud including the pub-
lic messaging servers, we propose to encrypt messages in messaging systems us-
ing Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). ABE is an one-to-many public key encryp-
tion system in which data are encrypted with access policies and only users with
attributes that satisfy the access policies can decrypt the ciphertexts, and hence is
considered as a promising solution for realizing expressive and ﬁne-grained access
control of encrypted data in public servers. Our proposed system, called Attribute-
Based Secure Messaging System with Outsourced Decryption (ABSM-OD), has
three key features: enabling expressive and ﬁne-grained access control of encrypted
messages by users, supporting outsourced decryption to the cloud while without
compromising conﬁdentiality of decrypted messages, and allowing server-aided re-
vocation to provide effective and instant user revocations.
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1. Introduction
Messaging systems such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, WeChat, Line, Viber, etc
are becoming very popular. Users from different localities have their preferred choices
of messaging services1. Since these messaging systems reside in the public domain and
are subjected to threats on the Internet, security savvy users might be reluctant to trust
the service providers to protect the privacy of their messages and there is a growing
demand to provide end-to-end encryption in public messaging services. Furthermore, in
a threat landscape study, instant messaging platforms are becoming attack vectors which
can result in further damages2.
Messages can be in the form of Electronic Mail (Email), Short Message Service
(SMS), Instant Messaging (IM), etc which allow users to share information and collab-
orate effectively. Previous messaging services focus on functionality over security and
the threats on the Internet poses challenges on these messaging services. In 1991, Phil
Zimmermann introduced the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)3 to protect the conﬁdentiality
and authenticity of emails. Later in 1995, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(S/MIME) (currently version 3.24) was introduced to provide a standard way to protect
1https://www.similarweb.com/blog/worldwide-messaging-apps
2https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/white-papers/Executive-Summary-CTAP.pdf
3PGP https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty Good Privacy
4S/MIME version 3.2 Message Speciﬁcation https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5751
A Systems Approach to Cyber Security
A. Roychoudhury and Y. Liu (Eds.)
© 2017 The authors and IOS Press.
This article is published online with Open Access by IOS Press and distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License 4.0 (CC BY-NC 4.0).
doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-744-3-86
86
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) email messages. However, due to the
complexity of the solutions and the need for user involvement, both PGP and S/MIME
are not widely adopted today [14]. In 2014, Google started implementing the OpenPGP5
standard (IETF RFC48806) as a Chrome Extension (End-To-End)7 to enhance the mes-
saging security within the browser. However, PGP and S/MIME are based on the tra-
ditional public key encryption hence have a drawback in scalability. Transport messag-
ing protocols like Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Se-
cure Shell (SSH), etc were introduced and enhanced to protect the delivery of messages.
However, transport protection is inadequate in protecting message security and privacy
as these messaging systems assume that the servers are trusted.
The Signal protocol is used in Signal [7], WhatsApp8, Facebook Messenger9 and
Allo10 to provide end-to-end encryption. These systems rely on trusted servers to ex-
change users’ public keys during communication. With the threats in the public domain,
key management and transport protection are insufﬁcient in protecting the data security
of messaging systems. In addition, these messaging systems assume that the servers re-
siding in the public domain are trusted. Public threats and malicious insiders can reduce
the data security and user privacy of these messaging systems.
ABE is a one-to-many public-key encryption where private keys of users and access
policy of encrypted data are based on user attributes. ABE allows a sender to embed
access policy with encrypted data and only authorized users will be able to gain access
to the original data and is widely considered as a promising technique for providing
expressive and ﬁne-grained access control of end-to-end encrypted data.
Some studies have considered secure messaging from an access control perspective
by integrating ABE with existing messaging systems [4][11][17]. However, these sys-
tems require the users to perform full decryption which can be resource intensive for
mobile users, especially if the ciphertexts have complex access policies. In [4] and [11],
revocation is achieved by issuing decryption keys with expiry date, however a direct
revocation approach might be more desirable.
In this work, we propose an Attribute-Based Secure Messaging System with Out-
sourced Decryption (ABSM-OD) which provides end-to-end message security on the
cloud. ABSM-OD is designed to operate in environments where the messaging servers
reside in a public untrusted domain. Messages are stored on the cloud and only autho-
rized users will be able to obtain the original data. Speciﬁcally, ABSM-OD possesses the
following three features.
Fine-grained Access Control of Encrypted Messages The use of ABE allows ex-
pressive and ﬁne-grained access control to be enforced on encrypted messages which
ensures end-to-end message conﬁdentiality.
Outsourced Decryption The computation of ABE decryption is ofﬂoaded to the
cloud, hence keeping the resource requirements on the users to the minimal and without
exposing users’ messages to the cloud.
5MIME Security with OpenPGP https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3156
6OpenPGP Message Format https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880
7End-To-End https://github.com/google/end-to-end
8https://whispersystems.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/
9https://whispersystems.org/blog/facebook-messenger/
10https://whispersystems.org/blog/allo/
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Effective User Revocation Compromised users can be directly revoked from the
system with the use of server-aided revocation technique. Users and attributes can be
managed effectively within the system.
With the features of ABSM-OD, enterprises operating their messaging systems in
the cloud will be able to preserve message security. Since only ciphertexts are available
on the cloud, cloud service providers will have no access to the underlying messages.
If the messaging systems are compromised, adversaries will only obtain the ciphertexts
and not the original messages. Furthermore, enterprises will be able to manage the access
control of messages effectively within a cloud environment.
2. Preliminaries
This section describes the notions that are to be used in the construction of ABSM-OD.
Symmetric Key Encryption: The scheme consists of the following:
• Key Generation k ← GenSE : It outputs a random key k.
• Encryption CTM ← EncSE(k,M) : Takes a key k and message M. It encrypts
message M with key k and outputs ciphertext CTM.
• Decryption M/⊥← DecSE(k,CTM) : Takes a key k and ciphertext CTM. It de-
crypts ciphertext CTM with key k and outputs message M or ⊥ indicates error.
Digital Signature: The scheme consists of the following:
• Key Generation (pk,sk)← GenDS: It outputs a signing key sk and verifying key
pk.
• Message Signing σM ← SignDS(sk,M) : Takes a signing key sk and message M.
It signs message M with signing key sk and outputs message signature σM.
• Message Veriﬁcation 1/0 ← VerifyDS(pk,M,σM) : Takes a verifying key pk,
message M and message signature σM. It veriﬁes message M with verifying key
pk. It outputs 1 when the message is valid, 0 if otherwise.
Ciphertext-Policy ABE with outsourced decryption: An ABE with outsourcing
decryption scheme proposed by Green et al. [9] that we denote as ABE-OD consists of
the following:
• (MSK,MPK) ← SetupABE(κ,U): Takes a security parameter κ and generates
master secret key MSK and master public key MPK.
• CTAM ← Encrypt
ABE(MPK,M,AM): Encrypts M using MPK and access struc-
ture AM and outputs an ABE ciphertext CTAM .
• (DKAu ,TKAu) ← KeyGenABE(MSK,Au): Generates transformation and decryp-
tion keys using input master secret key MSK and user attributes Au. It outputs a
decryption key DKAu and a transformation key TKAu .
• CTout ← TransformABE(TKAu , CTAM): Partially decrypts ciphertext CTAM us-
ing transformation key TKAu and outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext CTout .
• M/⊥ ← DecryptABE(DKAu ,CTout): Decrypts partially decrypted ciphertext
CTout with decryption keyDKAu and outputs a messageM or⊥where⊥ indicates
error.
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3. Proposed System Overview
Figure 1. Attribute-Based Secure Messaging System with Outsourced Decryption
Figure 1 illustrates the overall proposed system architecture of ABSM-OD. The sys-
tem comprises of four parties namely Key Generation Centre (KGC), Message Transfor-
mation Server (MTS), Messaging System (MS) and users. The KGC manages user at-
tributes, issues decryption keys to users based on their attributes and generates transfor-
mation keys to the MTS. The MTS determines recipients using the access policies of the
ciphertexts and transforms the ciphertexts for each recipient. The MS stores two types of
ciphertexts, ciphertexts received from the users and ciphertexts transformed by the MTS.
Users interact with the MS to send/retrieve ciphertexts.
The KGC generates the public parameter and the master private key, and issues MTS
with a signing and verifying key pair. Before a user can send/retrieve ciphertexts, a user
needs to be registered in the system. The user generates a signing and verifying key pair
and provides the verifying key to the KGC. The KGC registers the user with the verifying
key, a set of user attributes and an user identiﬁer, and generates ABE attribute keys (i.e.
transformation and decryption keys) for the user. The KGC issues the decryption key to
the user and distributes the user identiﬁer, user verifying key, user attributes and trans-
formation key to the MTS. Thereafter, the user will be able to send/retrieve ciphertexts.
When the user wants to send a message, the user encrypts the message with an ac-
cess policy and signs the ciphertext with a timestamp and the user identiﬁer. The user
then sends the ciphertext, timestamp, user identiﬁer and signature to the MS. When the
MS receives the ciphertext, the MS requests the user verifying key from the MTS us-
ing the user identiﬁer. If the user is unauthorized or revoked, no user verifying key is
returned and the MS will discard the ciphertext. If the user is valid, the MTS will return
the user verifying key to the MS for ciphertext veriﬁcation. If MS fails to verify the ci-
phertext, the ciphertext will be discarded. Once the ciphertext is veriﬁed, the MS will
forward the veriﬁed ciphertext to the MTS. As the MS is subjected to attacks in the pub-
lic domain, the MTS will verify the ciphertext again. If the veriﬁcation fails, MTS will
discard the ciphertext. Once the ciphertext is veriﬁed, MTS resolves the recipients based
on the access policy of the ciphertext, transforms the ciphertext for each recipient and
signs on the transformed ciphertexts. Thereafter, the MTS requests for MS to store the
transformed ciphertexts. When the users request for the ciphertexts, the MS will send the
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transformed ciphertexts to the users. Users will verify the transformed ciphertexts using
the MTS verifying key. If veriﬁcation fails, the transformed ciphertexts are discarded. If
the ciphertexts are valid, users will use their decryption keys to decrypt the ciphertexts
to obtain the original messages.
When a user is compromised, KGC will remove the user verifying key, user at-
tributes and transformation key from the MTS. Subsequently, the compromised user will
not be able to retrieve existing and new ciphertexts and any new ciphertexts generated by
the compromised user will be rejected by the MS or MTS.
3.1. Threat Model
We assume that the KGC is trusted. MTS is honest-but-curious such that it will honestly
follow the protocol as required but will attempt to obtain sensitive information such as the
message encrypted in a ciphertext. MTS operates within a private cloud and is assumed
not to collude with users. MS is untrusted and resides in the public cloud.
Any adversary will be able to compromise and gain access to the MS within the pub-
lic domain. If the adversary gain access to the MS, the ciphertexts and the transformed
ciphertexts should not reveal sensitive information.
3.2. Design Objectives
• Conﬁdentiality
The main objective is to design a secure messaging system that can provide end-
to-end message conﬁdentiality. The sender determines the access policies of the
encrypted messages and only privileged users can access the underlying mes-
sages.
• Efﬁcient Decryption
As mobile users may have limited resources, it is desirable to reduce the com-
putational cost of users in decryption. Towards this end, we adopt an ABE with
outsourced decryption [9] to ofﬂoad decryption operations to the cloud.
• Message Authenticity
With the prevalent of spam and malicious messages, it can be challenging for
users to recognize if received messages are valid, hence it will be desirable that
received messages are indeed authentic. As the sender will sign on the message
ciphertexts and MTS will sign on the transformed ciphertexts, the signing of ci-
phertexts will provide the authenticity of the messages.
• Traceability
The source and changes of ciphertexts can be crucial for audit purposes, hence
it is desirable for the system to maintain the traceability of the ciphertexts. To
achieve traceability, user identiﬁers are included into the ciphertexts and digital
signatures are used by the sender and MTS to sign the ciphertexts.
• Revocation
Another consideration is to provide an effective user and attribute revocation, any
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revoked users should no longer be able to access the system to send/retrieve mes-
sages. The use of direct revocation of users with server-aided technique achieves
this objective.
4. ABSM-OD Construction
In this section, we describe a concrete construction of ABSM-OD based on ABE-OD
[9], symmetric encryption and digital signature.
Assuming that the KGC keeps a list KGCSTORE, storing the user identiﬁer oidu,
user verifying key pku, user attributes Au. A tuple in KGCSTORE is represented as
〈oidu, pku,Au〉.
The MTS keeps a list MTSSTORE, storing the user identiﬁer oidu, user verifying
key pku, user attributes Au, transformation key TKu. A tuple in MTSSTORE is repre-
sented as 〈oidu, pku,Au,TKu〉.
TheMS keeps two types of ciphertexts (message ciphertexts and transformed cipher-
texts) in the list MSGSTORE. A message ciphertext includes a message identiﬁer midM,
user identiﬁer oidu, access structure AM, message timestamp tsM, message ciphertext
CTABEM and ciphertext signature σCTABE . A tuple of message ciphertext in MSGSTORE
is represented as 〈midM,oidu,AM, tsM,CTABEM ,σCTABE 〉. A transformed ciphertext in-
cludes a new message identiﬁer midTMi , sender user identiﬁer oids, recipient user iden-
tiﬁer oidri , a creation timestamp tsTMi , transformed ciphertext CT
ABE
TMi
and transformed
ciphertext signature σTi . A tuple of transformed ciphertext in MSGSTORE is represented
as 〈midTMi ,oids,oidri , tsTMi ,CT
ABE
TMi
,σTi〉.
System Initialization (MPK,MSK, pkmts,skmts)← Setup(κ ,U) : During the initial-
ization, KGC runs the ABE setup to create the master secret key MSK and public pa-
rameters MPK (i.e (MPK,MSK)← SetupABE(κ,U)). In addition, KGC issues a pair of
signing key and verifying key to the MTS (i.e. (pkmts,skmts)← GenDS for MTS).
User Registration (DKu,TKu)←RegisterUser(MSK,oidu, pku,Au): To allow a user
u to use the system, KGC needs to register the user u in the system. First, the user u
generates a signing and verifying key pair (pku,sku)← GenDS and provides the verify-
ing key pku to the KGC. KGC registers the user u in the system with the user identi-
ﬁer oidu, user verifying key pku, user attributes Au and provides the user identiﬁer oidu,
user verifying key pku to the MTS. KGC performs the Attribute Key Generation (i.e
(DKu,TKu)← KeyGen(oidu,MSK,Au)) to update transformation key TKu and user at-
tributes Au of user u to the MTS and issues the decryption key DKu to user u.
Attribute Key Generation (DKu,TKu) ← KeyGen(oidu,MSK,Au): When a user
u requires a set of attribute keys, KGC performs the ABE Key Generation (i.e
(DKu,TKu) ← KeyGenABE(MSK,Au)) to obtain the decryption key DKu and transfor-
mation key TKu of user u.
Attribute Key Update (DK
′
u,TK
′
u)←KeyUpdate(oidu,MSK,A
′
u): When the user at-
tributes of user u changes from Au to A
′
u, KGC updates the user attributes from Au to A
′
u.
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KGC revokes the transformation key TKu of user u on the MTS. Also, KGC performs
Attribute Key Generation (i.e (DK
′
u,TK
′
u)←KeyGen(oidu,MSK,A
′
u)) and updates MTS
with the new transformation key TK
′
u and new user attributes A
′
u. KGC issues the new
decryption key DK
′
u to user u.
User Revocation 1/0←RevokeUser(oidu): When a user u is compromised, the user
u will need to be revoked in the system. KGC and MTS will need to revoke the user
verifying key pku, user attributes Au and transformation key TKu of user u. The tuples
in KGCSTORE and MTSSTORE will be updated as 〈oidu,−,−〉 and 〈oidu,−,−,−〉 re-
spectively. Once revoked, any veriﬁcation of ciphertexts signed by user u with identiﬁer
oidu at the MS and MTS will fail and the MTS will not transform any new ciphertexts
for user u.
Message Encryption CTABE ← EncryptMessage(MPK,M,AM,oidu,sku): When
a user u wants to send a message M, the user u will specify the access structure
AM to encrypt the message. The user u generates a random key kM ← GenSE to en-
crypt the message M (i.e CTM = Enc
SE(kM,M)). The user u performs the ABE en-
cryption on the random key kM with access structure AM to get the key ciphertext
CTABEkM
= EncryptABE(MPK,kM,AM). The ciphertext CT
ABE
M = (CTM,CT
ABE
kM
) forms
the ciphertext for the message M. The ciphertext CTABEM , a message identiﬁer midM,
user identiﬁer oidu and ciphertext timestamp tsM forms the ciphertext CTABEM =
(midM,oidu,AM, tsM,CT
ABE
M ) for the MS. Before sending the ciphertext CTABEM ,
the user u signs the ciphertext CTABEM with the user signing key sku (i.e σCTABE ←
SignDS(sku,CTABEM )) and sends the ciphertext CTABE = (CTABEM ,σCTABE ) to MS.
MS and MTS will verify the ciphertext CTABE = (CTABEM ,σCTABE ) using the user
verifying key pku (i.e VerifyDS(pku,CTABEM ,σCTABE )). Once the ciphertext is veriﬁed,
the MTS determines recipients with attributes that satisﬁes the access structure AM of
the ciphertext CTABE . With the list of recipients RAM , the MTS uses the transformation
key TKri of each recipient ri ∈ RAM to transform the ciphertext CTABE .
Message Transformation CTTMi ←TransformMessage(CTABE ,oidri ,TKri ,skmts):
The MTS parses the ciphertext CTABE = (CTABEM ,σCTABE ), then parses ciphertext
CTABEM
= (midM,oidu,AM, tsM,CT
ABE
M ) and transforms the ciphertext CT
ABE
M for a
user u. The MTS transforms the key ciphertext CTABEkM
(CTABEM = (CTM,CT
ABE
kM
)) to get
the transformed key ciphertext CTABEouti =Transform
ABE(TKri ,CT
ABE
kM
) for a user u. Once
the key ciphertext CTABEkM
is transformed, MTS needs the MS to store the transformed
ciphertext CTABEouti . The ciphertext CT
ABE
TMi
= (CTM,CT
ABE
outi ) forms the transformed ci-
phertext for user u. A transformed message identiﬁer midTMi , sender user identiﬁer
oidu, recipient user identiﬁer oidri and timestamp tsTMi form the transformed cipher-
text CTTi = (midTMi ,oidu,oidri , tsTMi ,CT
ABE
TMi
) for user u that will be stored by MS.
MTS signs the transformed ciphertext CTTi with the MTS signing key skmts to get the
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signature σTi (i.e σTi ← SignDS(skmts,CTTi )). The MTS will then send the ciphertext
CTTMi = (CTTi ,σTi) to the MS. It outputs the transformed ciphertext CTTMi .
Message Decryption M/⊥←DecryptMessage(CTTMi , pkmts,DKri) : When a user
u receives the transformed ciphertext CTTMi = (CTTi ,σTi), the user u veriﬁes the trans-
formed ciphertext CTTMi with MTS verifying key pkmts (i.e Verify
DS(pkmts,CTTi ,σTi)).
Once the transformed ciphertext is veriﬁed, the user will decrypt the transformed key
ciphertext CTABEouti using the decryption key DKri to retrieve the random key kM/⊥ =
DecryptABE(DKri ,CT
ABE
outi ) or ⊥ indicates error.
If the user u is able to retrieve the random key kM. The user u performs the decryp-
tion to retrieve the message M/⊥ = DecSE(kM,CTM). If the decryption fails, an error⊥ will be returned to the user indicating an error.
4.1. Security Analysis
This section analyses the security of the system.
• Conﬁdentiality
Since all the ciphertexts are stored in the encrypted forms, malicious users whose
attributes do not satisfy the access policy of the ciphertext cannot obtain the con-
tent of the underlying message. Therefore, our ABSM-OD system preserves the
conﬁdentiality of the data users.
• Efﬁcient Decryption
With the use of ABE-OD scheme, the MTS will help the privileged users with
decryption and each user will only be required to perform the ﬁnal decryption
to retrieve the original message, hence reducing the computational cost require-
ments on the users.
• Message Authenticity
Any modiﬁcation of ciphertexts will be detected by the signature veriﬁcation.
• Traceability
When some ciphertexts or transformed ciphertexts are found with issues, the ci-
phertexts can be traced back to the source according to the ciphertext signature.
• Revocation
Once a user is revoked from the system, KGC updates the list in the MTS. The
ciphertext with a signature signed by a user that is not in the user list in the MTS
will not be accepted by MTS. Also, no ciphertext will be transformed for revoked
users as there is no transformation key in the MTS for revoked user. Users are
effectively revoked from the system.
5. Implementation
We implemented the ABSM-OD as a Simple Chat System in Java. Tests were conducted
for the main functions of the system. In the tests, we measure the recipients resolution
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time, encryption time, transformation time and decryption time with different number of
attributes and data size. The recipients resolution time is the time taken to determine the
number of recipients based on the access policy of a ciphertext. Other performance over-
heads like database, disk and network latency which are dependent on the deployment
are not the focus of our tests.
We tested the performance of recipients resolution on a system with Intel i7 2.6GHz
processor with 768 MB of RAM. Assuming that the system is supporting 10K users,
we generated random messages that are encrypted with access policies of 10 attributes
and operators (”AND”/”OR”). The results indicate that the system is able to resolve on
average 1404 recipients in around 514ms.
We also tested the performance of cryptographic operations on a system with Intel i7
2.6GHz processor with 8 GB of RAM. We generated random messages of different sizes
(1-64 MB) with access policies of 10 attributes and ”AND” operators. The messages
were encrypted with an average time of around 556ms, transformed around 144ms and
decrypted around 7ms. To test for possible worst case situation, we generated messages
of different sizes (1-64 MB) with access policies of 50 attributes and ”AND” operators.
The messages were encrypted with an average time of around 2.8s, transformed around
728ms and decrypted around 7ms. Table 1 summarized the preliminary results.
Table 1. Performance of Cryptographic Operations
No of Attributes Message Size Operators
Average Time
Encryption Transformation Decryption
10 1-64 MB AND 556ms 144ms 7ms
50 1-64 MB AND 2.8s 728ms 7ms
6. Related Work
Attribute-Based Encryption - ABE schemes can be broadly categorized into two cate-
gories namely, Key Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext- Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In
KP-ABE schemes, ciphertexts are associated with attributes while decryption keys are
associated with access structures. However, in CP-ABE schemes, the association is re-
versed where ciphertexts are associated with access structures while decryption keys are
associated with attributes.
The concept of ABE was ﬁrst proposed by Sahai and Waters [13] as a type of Fuzzy
Identity Based Encryption (Fuzzy-IBE) scheme. Subsequently, Goyal et al. [8] intro-
duced the notion of KP-ABE and CP-ABE and provided the construction for KP-ABE
scheme. Soon after, Bethencourt et al. [3] provided the construction for CP-ABE. Initial
work on ABE schemes focus on monotonic access structures, but soon, Ostrovsky et al.
[10] proposed an ABE scheme with non-monotonic policies to represent negative con-
straints. To meet the need for complex access policy, several efforts focus on providing
more ﬁne-grained access control. For instance, Bobba et al. [5] extended CP-ABE by rep-
resenting attributes as a recursive set structure and named the scheme Ciphertext-policy
Attribute-Set-Based Encryption (CP-ASBE or ASBE) while Wang et al. [16] introduced
Hierarchical Attribute-Based Encryption (HABE) by combining Hierarchical Identity-
based Encryption (HIBE) with CP-ABE. Thereafter, Wan et al. [15] introduced Hierar-
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chical Attribute-Set-Based Encryption (HASBE) by extending ASBE with users orga-
nized into a hierarchical structure to provide a more scalable, ﬂexible and ﬁne-grained
control of ABE.
Revocable ABE - Attrapadung and Imai [1] proposed two types of revocation tech-
niques, namely direct revocation and indirect revocation. Direct revocation is performed
by sender specifying the revocation list while indirect revocation is enforced by the key
authority providing key updates to non-revoked users. Attrapadung and Imai [2] also
presented a hybrid revocable attribute encryption (HR-ABE) by combining the two tech-
niques and data owner may select either technique. Boldyreva et al. [6] proposed an ef-
ﬁcient revocable KP-ABE scheme by improving the key updates. Sahai et al. [12] pro-
posed a revocable scheme by revoking stored data together with key updates. Yang et
al. [18] proposed a revocable ABE scheme by denying user decryption capability via a
cloud server.
Secure Messaging - Messaging protocols and solutions secure messages with a
wide range of techniques [14]. In particular, ABE is an upcoming and promising tech-
nique that can achieve secure messaging. Bobba et al. [4] proposed Attribute-Based Mes-
saging (ABM) by integrating ABE with Mail Transfer Agent (MTA). Weber et al. [17]
proposed MundoMessage which integrated ABE and Location-Based Encryption (LBE)
into emergency communication. In healthcare, Picazo-Sanchez et al. [11] incorporated
ABE into messaging protocol for monitoring and managing the medical wireless body
area networks (WBANs). Unger et al. [14] evaluated existing messaging systems and
established that messaging systems face three key challenges: trust establishment, con-
versation privacy and transport privacy. They also proposed a framework to evaluate the
properties of messaging systems.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a system architecture for an Attribute-Based Secure Messag-
ing System with Outsourced Decryption (ABSM-OD) that provides end-to-end message
security in the cloud. ABSM-OD is built upon ABE-OD scheme [9] and achieves three
key features namely ﬁne-grained access control, outsourced decryption and effective user
revocation. Our prototype implementation demonstrates the feasibility of the architec-
ture with reasonable performance. From our preliminary results, the system is able to
determine recipients from the access polices of ciphertexts within an acceptable amount
of time. Also, the decryption of transformed ciphertexts are more manageable for mobile
users. Hence, ABSM-OD can provide scalable and secure messaging within the public
cloud.
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